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The Responsiveness of Taxable Income Changes in Marginal Tax Rates in Barbados 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Since 2003 policymakers in Barbados have implemented a series of tax reforms that have 
lowered both basic as well as marginal income tax rates.  These changes have more than likely 
induced taxpayers to alter their behaviour in order to affect their reported taxable income.  This 
paper employs an annual sample of 3,000 individual taxpayers between 2003 and 2006 to 
investigate the sensitivity of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates.  The empirical 
approach adopted also allows the researcher to provided evidence on the variation in taxable 
income by gender and income group.  The paper finds that for every 1 percent rise in the 
marginal tax rate, taxable income decreases by 0.2 percent.  Further disaggregation of the 
database also revealed that a strong negative labour supply effect causes the elasticity for low-
income taxpayers to rise to 0.9, while females tend to be more responsive to changes in marginal 
taxes relative to males. 
 
JEL Classification: H2; H31; C23 
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1. Introduction 
 
Taxes are an important component of the economic policy mix.  If high-income individuals pay 
relatively higher rates of tax and those revenues are redistributed to poorer members of the 
society, taxes can reduce income inequality.  Taxes levied on income and the expenditure are 
used in developing countries to generate revenues to finance projects that can have significant 
benefits to long-run growth and development.  If these taxes, however, are used to finance the 
continued growth of the public sector, they can crowd-out overall private capital investment 
(Hayek, 1960).  In addition, by taking funds away from those members of society who are more 
likely to engage in investment activities, a poorly designed tax system can inhibit the long-run 
growth prospects for a country. 
 
The empirical literature has, for the most part, found evidence supporting the inverse association 
between taxes and economic growth.  Helms (1985) reports that higher tax rates, when used to 
fund transfer payments, has a negative impact on economic growth.  However, if these additional 
funds are employed to finance improvements in public services such as education, highways and 
public health and safety, the relationship is reversed.  This occurs since the quality of public 
services positively influences firms‟ location and production decisions.  Analogous results are 
obtained by Hines (1996) using enterprise-level observations, while Bleaney, Gemmell and 
Kneller (2001), using observations on 22 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development economies between 1970 and 1995 find that distortionary taxes adversely influence 
growth in both the short and long run. 
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In an attempt to speed-up the process of economic convergence, developing countries have, since 
the 1970s, engaged in major tax reform plans (Gills, 1989).  Tax reform is generally taken to 
imply some approach to improving the existing state of affairs.  For the most part major attempts 
at tax reform usually arise from the recognition of distortions and/or inequities created by the tax 
system.  Policymakers in these countries have therefore attempted to address these problems 
through broadening the tax base, flattening the tax rate structure as well as simplifying the overall 
tax administration systems. 
 
The effectiveness of these attempts at tax reform largely depends on the response of economic 
agents.  A fall in taxes, for example, could lead to a decline in labour supply by some economic 
agents as they take the opportunity to increase their leisure since their after-tax income has risen.  
In this scenario, the tax reform plan could lower national output.  However, it is also possible that 
the cutback in tax rates will encourage some individuals to engage in more overtime and thus 
lead to greater economic output.  Some economic agents can also respond to the change in taxes 
by changing the structure of their compensation packages, in an attempt to reduce their tax 
liabilities.  The response of economic agents to changes in tax rates is therefore ambiguous, i.e. it 
has to be assessed empirically, and may vary from one country to the next. 
 
Since the seminal work of Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) there have been numerous 
attempts to assess the impact of tax rate changes on taxpayers‟ responses.  In general, these 
studies report a statistically significant association between changes in marginal tax rates and 
taxable income.  However, the magnitude of this association is somewhat controversial.  Earlier 
studies in the area usually report relatively large elasticities, while more recent studies report 
relatively modest estimates.   
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This paper attempts to add to this debate by providing estimates of relationship between marginal 
taxes and taxable income in the small island developing state of Barbados.  Up until now, most of 
the research in the area has employed tax return data from US tax reforms that took place in 
1981, 1986 and 1993.  There are a number of reasons for utilising tax return data for Barbados.  
First, it allows the reader to assess whether the relationship between changes in tax rates and 
taxable income varies based on the country‟s level of economic development.  Second, the study 
also gives an analysis of the gender differentials of taxpayer responses. 
 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows.  Following the introduction, Section 2 
presents a review of the literature in the area.  Section 3 offers a brief description of tax reform in 
Barbados as well as a discussion of the data and the econometric approach employed.  Section 4 
provides the empirical results and conducts various tests for the robustness of analysis.  Section 5 
summarises the key empirical findings as well as discuss the main policy implications arising 
from the findings. 
 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Lindsey (1987) provides one of the first attempts to assess the relationship between changes in 
tax rates and taxable income using observations on individual tax returns.  Observations on 100 
data items for a stratified sample of 100,000 taxpayers are employed to assess the impact of the 
1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act.  This legislation provided for a series of tax rate reductions 
over a period of four years (1981-9184) and also shrink the size of the tax base by extending 
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Individual Retirement Accounts to basically all taxpayers and a two-earner deduction for working 
married couples.  To assess the effects of tax rates on taxable income, Lindsey first ranked the 
taxpayers by adjusted gross income and then did the same for tax returns in 1982.  The implicit 
assumption behind this approach is that taxpayers in successive fractiles corresponded to the 
same individuals in both years.  Using this approach, the author reported elasticity estimates with 
respect to tax rates and taxable income.  These elasticity estimates ranged from 0.7 for taxpayers 
earning $50,000, and up to as high as 2.0 for taxpayers with incomes of $1,000,000.  These 
elasticity estimates were large, suggesting that for high-income taxpayers a 1 percent reduction in 
the tax rate leads to greater than proportionate increase in taxable income.  The implication of this 
for policymakers is that tax rate increases, would likely generate less revenue that tax rate 
reductions.  The rise in reported income obtained by Lindsey could have occurred due to changes 
in labour supply and participation, changes in the form of compensation, reduced tax evasion and 
avoidance as well as changes in decisions regarding deductions.   
   
The main limitation‟s of Linsey‟s (1987) study was that the database employed did not provide 
the researcher with a panel of observations to conduct the empirical analysis.  In addition, the 
assumption that individuals in the successive fractiles are identical is quite strong and could have 
influenced the overall results.  Building on this early research, Feldstein (1995), utilised a panel 
of individual tax returns that allows the researcher to follow the same individual over several 
years.  In contrast to Lindsey, Feldstein conducted his analysis around the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, however, the characteristics of both plans were similar: reduced marginal tax rates as well 
as broadened the tax base.  Nevertheless, Feldstein also obtained relatively large elasticity 
estimates: around 1.0 to 1.5. 
 
 6 
Auten and Carroll (1999), however, notes that these earlier studies did not employ effective 
controls for other nontax factors that may have impacted on income changes.  A panel of over 
15,000 individuals is examined for the years before and after the 1986 tax reform episode.  
Utilising a two-stage regression approach, Auten and Carroll attempt to control for the effects of 
various individual taxpayer characteristics (for example, age, occupation, marital status and 
region) on reported income.  The empirical results, in contrast to earlier studies, suggest an 
elasticity estimate of around 0.6.  In reconciling Auten and Caroll‟s result to those of Lindsey 
(1987) and Feldstein (1995), Goolsbee (2000) notes that there may be significant differences 
between the short- and long-run elasticities.  Using a restricted sample of only corporate 
executives, the author finds that while the short-run response of taxable income to changes in tax 
rates exceeds 1, after just one year the elasticity estimate drops to 0.4.   
 
Gruber and Saez (2002) also attempt to control for these dynamic effects by using a database 
containing a large number of households observed over the 1980s.  The regression model 
expresses changes in individual income as a function of marginal tax rate change, changes in 
after-tax income, the previous year‟s income, base year, marital status dummies and a spline term 
to capture the non-linear effects of taxes rate changes on income distribution.  Gruber and Saez 
obtain an elasticity estimate of 0.4, with lower estimates for real and broadly defined income.  
Using a somewhat different approach, which compares the effects that differences in state income 
tax rates have on taxable income of individuals with the same income and demographic 
characteristics, Long (1999) obtains a relatively similar elasticity estimate.  Kopczuk (2005) also 
find relatively low elasticity estimates, but notes that elasticity may depend on available 
deductions. 
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There are two main drawbacks of these early approaches: (1) the tax reform episodes considered 
usually involved a change in tax rates as well as allowances or deductions, making it difficult to 
separate these two effects, and; (2) the analysis was based on comparisons of high and low- to 
middle-income taxpayers, which could be affected by increased inequality.  Saez (2003) employs 
a somewhat different approach to evaluate the relationship between tax rates and income.  
Instead, the author uses „bracket creep‟ as the source of variation in tax rates.  Using observations 
on around 40,000 individuals observed between 1979-1981, Saez obtained elasticity estimates of 
0.3 for the full sample, and 0.4 for married taxpayers and 0.2 for singles.  While these estimates 
are significantly lower than earlier studies, such as those by Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995), 
they are in line with recent studies in the area.   
 
 
3. Tax Reform in Barbados 
 
The income tax system in Barbados is presently regulated by Income Tax Act, Cap. 73 and 
requires that income taxes should be levied on all persons that have earned income in Barbados 
during the year.  Taxable income generally includes income from all business, property, offices 
and employment.  There are two tax rates, the basic and marginal rates of tax.  The basic tax rate, 
set at 20 percent is applied to the first $24,200 of taxable income for the tax year.  The marginal 
tax rate, presently at 35 percent, is then assessed on all income in excess of $24,200.   
 
Table 1 shows the importance of personal taxes to revenue collections in the island by providing 
observations on the amount and share of various taxes collected over five year intervals since 
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FY1985/86.  At the end of FY2006/07 total personal income tax receipts were $297.4 million, the 
third largest single category behind the value-added tax (VAT) and company taxes.   
 
Table 1: Tax Revenue in Barbados 
 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 2000/01 2006/07 
BDS $m      
Tax Revenue 606.5 891.8 1081.5 1596.3 2066.6 
Taxes on Income and Profit 204.2 249.6 376.5 599.0 810.3 
  Personal Income Tax 134.5 140.0 213.6 293.4 297.4 
  Company Tax 56.8 95.1 133.5 268.8 444.9 
  Other 12.9 14.6 29.4 36.8 68.0 
Levies 29.5 91.3 13.4 14.6 0.0 
Taxes on Property 34.7 46.2 69.7 95.3 150.8 
Taxes on Goods and Services 166.7 285.7 438.0 753.7 911.8 
Import Duties 115.5 117.8 93.1 120.6 167.6 
Other Taxes 85.5 101.1 90.7 13.1 26.1 
      
% of Total      
Tax Revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Taxes on Income and Profit 33.7 28.0 34.8 37.5 39.2 
  Personal Income Tax 22.2 15.7 19.8 18.4 14.4 
  Company Tax 9.4 10.7 12.3 16.8 21.5 
  Other 2.1 1.6 2.7 2.3 3.3 
Levies 4.9 10.2 1.2 0.9 0.0 
Taxes on Property 5.7 5.2 6.4 6.0 7.3 
Taxes on Goods and Services 27.5 32.0 40.5 47.2 44.1 
Import Duties 19.0 13.2 8.6 7.6 8.1 
Other Taxes 14.1 11.3 8.4 0.8 1.3 
   Source: Central Bank of Barbados‟ Annual Statistical Digest. 
 
Prior to the 2002-2006 tax reforms, there were three prior major tax reform efforts in Barbados‟ 
history in 1986, 1992 and 1997 (Howard, 2006).  The 1986 tax reform system reduced the 
taxable income of a large number of taxpayers, as individuals earning $15,000 or less were now 
exempted and all taxpayers were provided with a standard deduction of $15,000.  In the ensuing 
years, the tax system was made more complex and inefficient via a system of itemised 
allowances and deductions.  These policy changes resulted in a significant fall in taxable income: 
the contribution of personal income taxes to total tax receipts fell by 6.5 percentage points to just 
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15.7 percent, contributing to one of the largest single fiscal deficits on record in 1990/1991.  The 
1992 reform effort there attempted to simplify the system and improve the efficiency of the 
income tax system.  The main policy changes were a reduction in standard deduction to $13,000, 
a reduction in the top marginal tax rate from 50 to 40 percent and the elimination of most 
itemised deductions.  These policy changes were more revenue efficient and therefore resulted in 
a 4 percentage point or $38.4 million increase in the contribution of personal income taxes to 
overall tax receipts.  The third reform in 1997 replaced a number of consumption based taxes 
with a VAT system.     
 
The most recent tax reform effort began in 2001.  In the 2001 Financial Statement of Economic 
and Financial Policies, the Government communicated the desire to ensure that tax rates in 
Barbados were not out of sync with other regional economies.  No changes were, however, made 
to individual income taxes payable in this year.  From 2003 onward, however, Government made 
sweeping changes to both the standard deduction as well as basic and marginal tax rates.  Table 2 
shows that the standard deduction jumped by 50 percent: from $15,000 in 2002 to $22,500 by 
2006.  In addition, both the basic and marginal tax rates were lowered by 5 percentage points 
over the four year period.   
 
Table 2: 2002-2006 Tax Reform 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Standard Deduction $15,000 $15,000 $17,500 $20,000 $22,500 
Basic tax rate 25% 22.5% 20% 20% 20% 
Marginal tax rate 40% 40% 40% 37.5% 35% 
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Although the 2002-2006 tax reform effort constituted one of the most significant changes in tax 
policy in recent memory, little or no research has examined the implications of this reform.  To 
provide an initial investigation of the distributional impact of this change, an approach similar to 
that outlined by Mascoll (1991) is employed: using income and allowance values for the 
representative tax payer, the effective tax rate is calculated for three representative individuals 
and the results are provided in Table 3.  The results provided in the table suggest that the primary 
beneficiaries of the tax change seemed to have been middle- to high-income individuals as these 
representative tax payers would have experienced a three percentage point decline in their 
effective rates of tax after the 2002-2006 tax reform effort. 
 
Table 3: Distributional Impact 2002-2006 Tax Reform 
on the Representative Tax Payer 
 Before After 
INCOME   
Low Income Individual   
1.  Gross Annual Income               25,000         25,000  
2.  Less Allowances               23,000         23,000  
3.  Taxable Income                 2,000           2,000  
4.  Income Taxes Paid                    500              400  
5.  Effective Tax Rate 2% 2% 
6.  Real after-tax Income                24,500         24,600  
   
Middle Income Individual   
1.  Gross Annual Income               64,000         64,000  
2.  Less Allowances               27,500         27,500  
3.  Taxable Income               36,500         36,500  
4.  Income Taxes Paid               10,970           9,145  
5.  Effective Tax Rate 17% 14% 
6.  Real after-tax Income                53,030         54,855  
   
High Income Individual   
1.  Gross Annual Income             125,000        125,000  
2.  Less Allowances               40,500         40,500  
3.  Taxable Income               84,500         84,500  
4.  Income Taxes Paid               30,170         25,945  
5.  Effective Tax Rate 24% 21% 
6.  Real after-tax Income                94,830         99,055  
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It is likely, however, that the tax reform plan may have changed the behaviour of individual tax 
payers.  For example, individuals might decide to increase their supply of labour to the labour 
market as a result of the reduction in effective tax rates or vice versa.  The results reported in 
Table 3 do not take such behavioural responses into account.  The following section therefore 
outlines an empirical approach that can be employed to examine the behavioural response of 
Barbadians to changes in marginal tax rates. 
 
 
4. Empirical Approach 
 
The empirical approach employed in this study is similar to that proposed by Gruber and Saez 
(2002) who develop a microeconomic model to decompose the changes in taxable income due to 
changes in marginal tax rates and after-tax income.  The empirical specification of the regression 
equation is of the following form: 
itittitittit
tttiitit
yTyyTy
TTyy






))](/())(log[(
)]1/()1log[()/log(
111
11
             (1) 
where ity  is before-tax income for individual i  in period t , i  and t  are unobserved 
individual- and time-specific effects respectively, itT  is the marginal tax rate, )( itit yT  is the tax 
liability and itv  is an error term that is assumed to have normal properties.  The term 
)]1/()1log[( 1 tt TT  in Equation (1) captures the effect that changes in tax rates have on 
reported income, while the term ))](/())(log[( 111   ittitittit yTyyTy  is the change in tax 
liability or the income effect of a change in tax rates. 
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Both of the terms on the right-hand side of Equation (1) are likely to correlated with the error 
term.  As a result, the equation is estimated using two stage least squares (2SLS).  To control for 
the endogeneity of these terms, the predicted log of net-of-tax rate change and the predicted log 
of after-tax income change if there were no behavioural response if real income does not change 
are employed as an instruments for )]1/()1log[( 1 tt TT  and ))(/())(( 111   ittitittit yTyyTy , 
respectively.     
 
There are a number of other factors that can impact on changes in before-tax income.  If these 
factors are not captured in the regression model the elasticity of income to changes in tax rates 
could be imprecisely estimated.  As a result, the log of initial income, age, initial age-squared, the 
initial number of children and marital status are include in the regression equation.  The initial 
income variable captures any reversion-to-the-mean effects, while age, age-squared, the number 
of children and marital status attempt to capture any life-cycle and household effects. 
 
The observations employed in this study uses a specially generated database of randomly selected 
individuals from the Inland Revenue Department of Barbados.  The analysis is conducted over 
the period 2003 to 2006 and provides information on all the items on the tax return form for 3000 
individuals each year.  Since the database provides cross-section rather than panel data, the 
approach proposed by Lindsey (1987) is employed to use the four separate samples of tax returns 
to approximate the difference-in-differences method to analysing the impact of changes in tax 
rates.  The framework ranks the taxpayers by before-tax income for all four years and then stacks 
the cross-sections to create a panel.  The technique therefore makes the assumption that 
individual‟s ranks remain unchanged from year to year. 
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Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the database.  Median net income from employment 
over the sample period for individuals captured in the database was $27,783, with the maximum 
earnings from income for any one individual being $787,977.  The median individual paid about 
$1,125 in taxes after claiming $21,419 in deductions.  Besides the personal allowance, the 
median taxpayer also claimed about $11,211 in allowances for home improvement, savings in 
credit unions as well as the purchase of new shares or mutual funds.  Savings in credit unions was 
the most popular allowance claimed with 35 percent of taxpayers utilising this vehicle to reduce 
their tax liability.  In contrast, less than one percent of tax payers utilised the allowance for 
investment in venture capital funds.  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations 
Age 41.666 41.000 102.000 16.000 12.571 11670 
Marital Status 2.229 3.000 3.000 1.000 0.965 7956 
Gender 1.472 1.000 2.000 1.000 0.499 10756 
Resident 1.012 1.000 2.000 1.000 0.109 7898 
Total Assessable Income 34297.630 27435.460 786976.800 -85671.000 30411.400 12000 
Tot Deductions Allowed 22303.850 21419.520 65500.000 0.000 6103.351 12000 
Taxable Income 13585.660 5412.515 766476.800 0.000 27329.710 12000 
Tax Payable 3609.982 1118.000 301748.000 0.000 9408.222 12000 
Tax Paid 3618.629 1125.000 301748.000 0.000 9415.951 12000 
PAYE 4196.302 1681.030 302553.200 -2372.290 8797.850 12000 
Income from Employment 35493.940 27782.740 786976.800 0.000 31802.330 11339 
Net Income from Employment 32598.080 26466.480 786976.800 0.000 30172.390 12000 
Income from Pensions 11824.080 0.000 170661.200 0.000 19747.620 1009 
Personal Allowance 19033.490 20000.000 30000.000 0.000 3679.664 11870 
Spouse Allowance 2773.014 3000.000 3000.000 0.000 793.871 793 
Venture Capital Funds 1235.239 0.000 10000.000 0.000 3068.047 71 
Share/Mutual Funds 5102.274 4159.800 10000.000 0.000 4321.169 711 
NIS Contributions 518.453 117.580 3636.600 0.000 726.485 253 
Savings in Cooperative 2012.134 2197.615 6000.000 0.000 1269.929 4190 
Trade Union Subs 212.802 234.000 240.000 0.000 54.016 3430 
Parliamentary Subs 422.938 0.000 5000.000 0.000 1104.356 105 
Home Improvement 5040.358 4855.390 10000.000 0.000 3400.843 3567 
Total Other Deductions 2648.558 321.385 35500.000 0.000 4037.276 12000 
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5. Results 
5.1 Preliminary Estimates 
 
Table 5 utilises the methodology outlined in the previous section to estimate the elasticity of tax 
rate changes.  Two income variables are considered, total income and taxable income, with the 
latter being total income adjusted for any changes in allowances.  In addition, the results are 
reported with and without the control variables.  Looking first at the results without the control 
variables, the model is able to explain about 55 percent of the fluctuation in total reported income 
over the sample period (column 2).  The coefficient on the marginal tax variable is positive and 
statistically significant suggesting that as tax rates increase total income also rises.  This result 
could be associated with the impact of tax rates on labour supply decisions: if tax rates encourage 
individuals to supply more labour then total income is likely to be positively associated with 
marginal tax rates.  The coefficient on the tax liability variable is also positive and statistically 
significant and suggests that as individuals‟ after-tax income rises they are more likely to report 
higher levels of income. 
 
Table 5: Basic Taxable Income Elasticity Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: )/log( 1itit yy  
Total 
Income 
Taxable 
Income 
Total 
Income 
Taxable 
Income 
)]1/()1log[( 1
b
t
b
t TT   
0.117 
(0.045)** 
-0.381 
(0.021)** 
0.182 
(0.027)** 
-0.191 
(0.018)** 
))](/())(log[( 111   it
b
titit
b
tit yTyyTy  
1.702 
(0.025)** 
1.955 
(0.012)** 
1.697 
(0.016)** 
2.090 
(0.011)** 
)log( 1ity  
- - -0.046 
(0.002)** 
-0.022 
(0.002)** 
Age  - - 0.001 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000)** 
2Age  - - 0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
StatusMarital  - - -0.004 
(0.004)** 
-0.001 
(0.000)* 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.549 0.900 0.622 0.904 
s.e. of regression 0.054 0.025 0.042 0.023 
    Notes: ** and * indicates significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
 
The exclusion of important life-cycle and household effects could potentially lead to some bias in 
the reported coefficient estimates in column 2.  As a result, the regression model was augmented 
with controls for initial income, age and marital status.  The inclusion of these variables in the 
regression model resulted in the elasticity of total income to changes in marginal tax rates rising 
from 0.117 to 0.182: for every 1 percent increase in marginal tax rates, total income usually 
increases by about 0.2 percent.  In contrast, the coefficient on the tax liability variable falls 
slightly to 1.697.  The response of tax payers to changes in tax liability is therefore highly elastic 
and could be due to the incentive effects of tax rates on tax evasion and tax avoidance.  
Individuals that were previously evading taxes may be encouraged to file if their tax liability is 
likely to be relatively low, while tax avoiders may not find it worthwhile to engage in complex 
financial transactions to reduce their tax liability.  
 
It is also of interest to policymakers to have an estimate of the impact that changes in marginal 
tax rates have on taxable income, total reported income less any allowances and deductions.  The 
relationship between taxable income and marginal tax rates could provide evidence of whether or 
not higher tax rates encourage filers to find vehicles to reduce their tax liability.  Column 4 and 5 
of Table 5 reports the taxable income elasticities.  The regression results reported in the two 
columns suggest that the empirical model is able to explain about 90 percent of the fluctuation in 
reported taxable income in Barbados.  The estimates of the elasticity of taxable income to 
changes in marginal tax rates in column 4 is -0.381 so that for every 1 percent increase in tax 
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rates, reported taxable income decreases by about 0.4 percent.  This finding therefore agrees with 
a priori reasoning that higher marginal tax rates might encourage individuals to find ways of 
investing their assets in ways that would reduce their taxable income and therefore their tax 
liability.  The elasticity estimate of 0.4 is also on par with recent estimates for the US derived by 
Gruber and Saez (2002).  The tax liability coefficient also reinforces this result, with a rise in 
after-tax income leading to a rise in reported taxable income.  When the model is augmented with 
control variables to account for life-cycle and household effects, the coefficient on the tax 
liability variable rises slightly.  However, the elasticity of taxable income to changes in marginal 
tax rate falls to about 0.2 and on par with that obtained by Saez (2003). 
 
 
5.2 Income Levels 
 
Higher income individuals more respond in different ways to tax rate changes relative to lower 
income persons.  Higher income individuals may be better placed to invest in assets that would 
reduce their tax liability.  In contrast, since lower income persons are unlikely to utilise such 
instruments, they may respond to tax rate increases by reducing their labour supply.  To examine 
the differences in responses to marginal tax rate changes on low and high income individuals, the 
lower quartile and the upper quartile of individuals were extracted from the database.  Equation 
(1) was then re-estimated for each of these two groups. 
 
The regression results for the two groups of tax payers are provided in Table 6.  Column 2 of the 
table indicates that lower income individuals tend to report reduced levels of total income after an 
increase in marginal tax rates.  These findings imply that higher taxes tend to have a negative and 
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significant disincentive effect on the amount of hours worked by lower income individuals in 
Barbados.  The coefficient estimate suggest that there is one-to-one relationship between changes 
in tax rate and total income: for every 1 percent rise in the marginal tax rate, total reported 
income of lower income tax payers tends to fall by 1 percent. 
 
There is also a significant difference in the response of changes in total income to changes in 
after-tax income for high- and low-income individuals.  For lower income taxpayers, a 1 percent 
rise in after-tax income elicits a greater than proportionate change in total reported income, while 
for higher income filers a 1 percent rise in the after-tax income leads to a less than 1 percent 
change in total reported income.         
 
Table 6: Taxable Income Elasticity Estimates (Income Differences) 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Total Income Taxable Income 
Dependent Variable: )/log( 1itit yy  
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low 
Income 
)]1/()1log[( 1
b
t
b
t TT   
0.287 
(0.022)** 
-0.955 
(0.053)** 
-0.188 
(0.017)** 
-0.853 
(0.017)** 
))](/())(log[( 111   it
b
titit
b
tit yTyyTy  
0.876 
(0.019)** 
1.687 
(0.023)** 
2.063 
(0.015)** 
1.735 
(0.008)** 
)log( 1ity  
-0.001 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
Age  0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)* 
2Age  -0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
StatusMarital  -0.001 
(0.000)* 
-0.006 
(0.001)* 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.000)* 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.751 0.917 0.963 
s.e. of regression 0.035 0.031 0.017 0.011 
    Notes: ** and * indicates significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 6 also attempts to measure the differences in the reported taxable income of low- and high-
income taxpayers to changes in the marginal tax rate.  The elasticity of taxable income to changes 
in the marginal tax rate was approximately 4.5 times larger than that for high income individuals: 
for every 1 percent rise in the marginal tax rate, taxable income decreases by 0.8 percent, 
compared to 0.2 percent for high income tax payers.  This result could be driven by the strong 
labour supply response of low income taxpayers reported early that offsets the advantages high 
income individuals may have in terms of tax planning.    
 
 
5.3 Gender 
 
Aaberge et al. (1999) and Smith et al. (2003) both suggest that the labour supply responses of 
females may differ from that for males.  For women, children can have a major impact on their 
labour supply decisions.  Tax rate changes impact on these decisions by influencing the 
opportunity costs staying out of the labour force.  Prohibitively high marginal tax rates reduces 
the opportunity cost of staying out of or leaving the labour force, while relatively lower marginal 
tax rates raises the opportunity cost and might therefore encourage more women to enter the 
labour force.  If marginal tax rates have a relatively greater impact on the opportunity cost of 
staying out of the labour force for women relative to men, then the elasticity of income to 
changes in marginal taxes should be larger for females. 
 
Table 7 provides the elasticities disaggregated by for different genders.  The elasticity estimates 
provided in column 2 are in general agreement with a priori expectations: the coefficient on 
marginal tax rate for females is almost twice as large as that for males.  Females, on average, 
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therefore tend to be more responsive to tax rate changes than males, supplying relatively more 
labour when the tax rate increases and reducing their working hours as the tax rate decreases.  In 
terms of income responses to changes in after-tax income, there is relatively little difference in 
the responses of the two groups. 
 
In terms of the impact of marginal tax rate changes on taxable income, the result was quite 
similar to that obtained earlier for total income.  Females on average tend to report a significantly 
larger fall in taxable income as a result of a rise in the marginal tax rate.  The elasticity of taxable 
income to changes in marginal tax rates was about one quarter larger than that for males.   
 
Table 7: Taxable Income Elasticity Estimates (Gender Differences) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Total Income Taxable Income 
Dependent Variable: )/log( 1itit yy  
Males Females Males Females 
)]1/()1log[( 1
b
t
b
t TT   
0.146 
(0.042)** 
0.284 
(0.032)** 
-0.191 
(0.021)** 
-0.238 
(0.018)** 
))](/())(log[( 111   it
b
titit
b
tit yTyyTy  
1.786 
(0.026)** 
1.626 
(0.018)** 
2.115 
(0.013)** 
2.023 
(0.010)** 
)log( 1ity  
-0.000 
(0.000)* 
-0.001 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
Age  0.001 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000)** 
2Age  -0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
StatusMarital  -0.004 
(0.001)** 
-0.001 
(0.001)* 
0.001 
(0.000)** 
-0.001 
(0.000)* 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.625 0.618 0.917 0.887 
s.e. of regression 0.035 0.026 0.017 0.016 
   Notes: ** and * indicates significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Over the last five years, fiscal authorities in Barbados have made significant changes to the 
income tax structure in Barbados.  The 2002-2006 tax reform effort was probably one of the most 
noteworthy of the all the tax reform efforts were undertaken in the country.  During the period, 
the standard deduction rose by 50 percent and both the basic and marginal tax rates fell by 5 
percentage points.  These changes in the deductions as well as tax rates primarily benefited 
middle- to high-income individuals, with their marginal tax rates fall by about 3 percent, 
compared to no change for low-income individuals. 
 
Changes in marginal tax rates can have an impact on the labour supply decisions of economic 
agents, as well as their efforts to either avoid or evade taxes.  Previous research on the elasticity 
of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates suggest that a reasonable estimate lies between 
1 and 0.2 percent.  These results, however, were derived using data for the US and therefore are 
only of academic interest to Barbadian policymakers as these estimates can not be employed to 
forecast the effects of future tax reform efforts.  To provide estimates of the taxable income 
elasticity for Barbados, an annual database of individual taxpayers is obtained for the period 2003 
to 2006.  In each year a random sample of 3,000 tax payers is observed.   
 
Based on panel regression techniques, the study finds that for every 1 percent rise in marginal tax 
rates in Barbados total income of tax payers usually increases by about 0.2 percent.  This result 
seems to suggest that economic agents in Barbados, on average, tend to respond to higher tax 
rates by increasing their labour supply.  In relation to taxable income, in contrast, higher marginal 
tax rates seems to encourage motivate individuals to either avoid or evade taxes: a 1 percent rise 
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in marginal tax rates leads to a 0.2 percent reduction in taxable income.  The disincentive effect is 
even larger for low-income individuals and females. 
 
The findings reported in this study can not only be employed to forecast the effects of future 
changes in tax rates, but can also inform the overall process of conceptualising tax reform.  The 
study suggest that rather than having higher rates of tax, fiscal authorities should attempt to have 
a relative broad tax base with relatively low rates of marginal taxes.  Policymakers must also be 
cognisant of the impact that tax rate changes can have on the supply of labour and by extension 
growth and productivity.  While higher tax rates may lead to a marginal gain in tax revenues, 
these gains may come at the cost of lower hours worked, overtime and decision of individuals of 
whether or not to enter the labour force.   
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